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TEXT OF STATUTES 
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
iii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
AHAB MUSTAPHA ALY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880488-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and 
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at 
V, 1-7. Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's 
argument in Point I of its brief. Points II and III are adequately 
covered in Appellant's Opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The only case cited by the State in support of its 
argument that some jurisdictions have applied Rule 609 in 
determining whether the prior conviction of a State's witness should 
be suppressed (People v. Woodard, 590 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1979)) is 
inapplicable since the language of the statute involved in Woodard 
was substantially different from the language of Rule 609. 
The prior conviction of Ms. Finken should not have been 
suppressed under Rule 403. Defense counsel timely raised this issue 
in the trial court and requested Instruction No. 13 in a timely 
fashion. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as 
to the use which could be made of the prior conviction and the 
remaining instructions were not sufficient to adequately inform the 
jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13. 
(Reply to Point I) 
In its brief, the State concedes that 
[i]t appears that the majority position in the 
federal courts is that the process of weighing the 
probative value of evidence of a prior conviction 
against the prejudicial effect "to the defendant," 
places no limitation upon cross-examination of 
government witnesses because of possible 
prejudicial effect to them [citations omitted]. 
Respondent's Brief at 8. The State then asserts that "[o]ther 
jurisdictions have not followed this position" and cites People v. 
Woodard, 590 P.2d 391, 396 (Cal. 1979), in support of its 
assertion. Respondent's Brief at 9. However, Woodard fails to 
support the assertion since the language of California Evidence Code 
§788, the statute at issue in Woodard, is substantially different 
than that of Rule 609. California Evidence Code §788 provides in 
pertinent part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, it may be shown by the examination of the 
witness or by the record of the judgment that he 
has been convicted of a felony . . . 
Woodard, 590 P.2d at 393. 
The California rule does not contain the language "to the 
defendant" and is not patterned after federal rule 609. Hence, 
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whether it is applicable to witnesses for the State is irrelevant in 
determining whether Utah Rules of Evidence 609 can be used to 
suppress the prior convictions of a State witness. 
The Woodard Court noted that "although Evidence Code 
Section 788 [footnote omitted] authorizes the admission of prior 
felony convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness, a trial 
court must, when requested, exercise its discretion under Section 
352 [footnote omitted] and exclude this evidence if the probative 
value of the prior conviction is outweighed by other factors, such 
as the risk of undue prejudice." j[(3. at 393-4. California Evidence 
Code 352 provides: 
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the probability that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) 
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. 
Hence, while Rule 788 apparently does not provide for a balancing 
test similar to that in Utah Rules of Evidence 609, Rule 352 is 
similar to Utah Rules of Evidence 403 and provides for exclusion 
where the moving party can establish that the prejudicial effect of 
the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. 
Furthermore, the prior conviction involved in Woodard was 
that of a defense witness and not a witness for the State. Woodard 
did not address the issue raised in the present case and is 
inapplicable to the State's suggestion that other jurisdictions have 
used Rule 609 to suppress the convictions of a government witness. 
The State cites no other cases in support of this proposition. 
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The State asserts that even if the prior conviction was 
proper impeachment evidence, it could have been excluded under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 403. Respondent's Brief at 11. The State then 
implies that the trial court ruled that the potential foe prejudice 
outweighed the probative value of the conviction requiring exclusion 
under Rule 403 and that the trial court's determination of the issue 
"will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court so abused its 
discretion that there was a substantial likelihood of an unjust 
result [citations omitted]." Respondent's Brief at 11. 
Mr. Aly does not dispute that Rule 403 is applicable; 
however, Mr. Aly does dispute that the court reached its decision 
under Rule 403 or applied a balancing test in reaching its ruling 
which requires deference on appeal. 
As pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, the 
trial court seemed to confuse the two subsections of Rule 609 in 
reaching its decision and relied on subsection (a)(2) and the 
rationale that a conviction for distribution of controlled substance 
is not a crime of dishonesty in reaching its decision that the 
conviction would not have been admissible (T. 44). See Addendum B 
in Appellant's Opening Brief. In reaching its decision that it 
would have excluded the prior conviction of the State's witness, the 
court did not apply a balancing test under either Rule 609 or Rule 
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403.! The court stated: 
I will so rule at this time that if the conviction 
is one for distribution of a controlled substance, 
that that is not a crime that goes to the question 
of honesty or dishonesty and cannot be inquired 
into. 
(T. 44). The State's attempts to stretch this ruling to include 
such a balancing test (Respondent's Brief at 10-11) do not comport 
with the record. See Addendum B of Appellant's Opening Brief for 
entire transcript of argument and ruling. 
The State suggests that Rule 609 must be made applicable 
to State witnesses because otherwise the "unsettling result" of 
allowing a defendant to testify without cross-examination as to his 
prior convictions but requiring a State's witness to divulge his or 
her convictions would occur. Respondent's Brief at 9. However, 
such an "unsettling result" would be easily cured by an appropriate 
application of Rule 403, and avoiding such a result does not require 
this Court to misinterpret Rule 609. In the situation outlined by 
the State on page 9 of its brief, the prejudicial effect of the 
prior conviction of the State's witness may well outweigh its 
probative value where numerous convictions of the defendant are 
1
 While under 609(a)(1) the party that wishes to admit 
the prior conviction must establish that the probative value 
outweighs its prejudicial effect, thereby requiring admission, the 
burden is reversed under Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, the party 
seeking to suppress the conviction must establish the prejudicial 
effect substantially outweighs the probative value. Furthermore, 
the test under Rule 609(a)(1) explicitly requires that the focus be 
on the prejudice to the defendant whereas Rule 403 makes no such 
requirement and allows to focus on the prejudicial impact of the 
evidence to the party seeking to exclude it. 
suppressed, thereby requiring exclusion of the conviction of the 
government witness under Rule 403. 
In the instant case, the prejudicial effect of the prior 
conviction of Ms. Finken did not outweigh its probative value. 
Mr. Aly did not testify and he had no prior convictions which were 
suppressed. The credibility of Ms. Finken was the primary issue in 
this case, and, as outlined in Appellant's Opening Brief at 19-20, 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance is a crime which reflects on 
both the credibility and the reliability of a witness. No prejudice 
to Ms. Finken was argued and, in fact, the State did not object when 
defense counsel elicited the response (T. 39). Furthermore, on 
direct examination, Ms. Finken acknowledged that she stopped working 
for Mr. Aly because she was arrested on a probation violation 
(T. 35). Hence, through the direct questioning of the prosecutor, 
Ms. Finken informed the jury that she had been convicted of a 
crime. Because the prejudicial effect of the conviction did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value, Rule 403 did not require 
exclusion of the conviction. 
The State contends that Instructions Nos. 8 and 9 
adequately covered the information contained in Defendant's proposed 
Instruction No. 13. Respondent's Brief at 11-12. However, as 
pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-27, while Instruction 
No. 9 lists a number of factors that can be taken into account when 
assessing credibility, it fails to include the prior conviction of a 
witness. The factors listed are thereby emphasized and the jury is 
left with almost an implication that the prior conviction is not a 
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factor to consider. 
Nor does Instruction No. 8 inform the jury that it can 
consider a witness1 prior conviction in assessing credibility. That 
instruction deals with the reconciliation of conflicts in the 
evidence and how to proceed where the jury believes a witness 
wilfully testified falsely. It does not guide the jury as to how it 
should go about assessing the credibility and reliability of a 
witness. 
Finally, the State contends that Defendant did not submit 
the instruction in a timely fashion and cites State v. Evans, 668 
P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) in support of that proposition. Respondent's 
Brief at 12-13. In Evans, the Court recessed for almost three hours 
and the trial judge informed the parties that he would be preparing 
instructions during the recess. The Defendant did not proffer the 
requested instructions until the Court "was about to read the 
instructions to the jury . . ." I_d. at 567. Defense counsel had 
not informed the Court earlier that he intended to submit 
instructions nor asked for a continuance for the purpose of 
preparing instructions. The trial court refused to consider the 
instructions. 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that 
the parties request their instructions at the close of the evidence 
or "at such earlier time as the court reasonably direct." 
In the instant case, the proposed instruction was 
initially requested on the first day of trial prior to the close of 
evidence (T. 43-4). Defense counsel requested that the court use 
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its "stock felony conviction" instruction but was interrupted by the 
prosecutor, who questioned the appropriateness of such an 
instruction (T. 43). A short argument ensued, and the trial court 
denied the requested instruction (T. 44). See Addendum 33, 
Appellant's Opening Brief. 
All of the evidence was presented on the first day of 
trial. When the court reconvened on the second day of trial, the 
trial judge held a hearing outside the presence of the jury. The 
judge stated on the record: 
We have met with counsel in chambers and gone over 
jury instructions. The Court has put together a 
set of instructions, counsel has had a chance to 
review those overnight. Counsel for the defendant 
presented one additional instruction this morning, 
and we will give that some consideration at this 
time. 
(TF. 1). Defense counsel then argued the appropriateness of giving 
Instruction No. 13. In reaching his decision not to give the 
instruction, the trial judge reiterated that he had previously ruled 
that he would have sustained an objection to the prior conviction 
evidence and ruled that, under such circumstances, the proposed 
instruction was not appropriate (TF. 2-3). See Addendum C in 
Appellant's Opening Brief. 
At no time did the trial court indicate that the 
instruction was not timely, nor did he refuse to review it, as was 
the case in Evans. The procedure of reviewing and discussing the 
instructions in chambers then considering the matter on the record 
indicates that the instruction was requested and considered in a 
timely fashion and that no party to the proceedings considered the 
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matter waived. In fact, presenting the instruction on the morning 
of the second day of trial appears from the record to have been the 
only appropriate time for doing so within the context of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant, Ahab Mustapha Aly, 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this lty~~ day of May, 1989. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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